Discussion of Africa was almost completely absent from this year’s US presidential campaign. That might lead Africans to expect nothing of substance from the administration of President-elect Donald Trump once he takes office in January.
But reading between the lines of Trump’s campaign promises—and looking back on the president-elect’s first administration—reveals that Africa can expect substantial changes from the United States over the next four years.
Trump’s first term
In his first term, Trump’s isolationist strategy and “America first” foreign policy led him to advocate for Congress to reduce development programs. Most of them are in Africa. While administration officials such as Mike Pompeo and Trump family members—including his wife, Melania, and his daughter Ivanka—visited several countries in Africa, Trump never actually visited himself. During his four years in the White House, Trump welcomed only two Sub-Saharan African heads of state: Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. His administration did not host a US-Africa summit; meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin spectacularly kicked off a series of Russia-Africa summits, the first taking place in Sochi in 2019.
Notably, Trump recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory of Western Sahara in 2020, making the Maghreb country a decisive player in the Abraham Accords. From this precedent, the kingdom could see its importance rise under Trump 2.0.
Seeing Africa through a lens of competition with China
Following substantial growth in China’s influence in Africa—and the weakening of US influence in Africa—the Trump administration created the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which was better funded than its predecessors. The first Trump administration also launched the Prosper Africa initiative, in an effort to “support US investment across the continent, grow Africa’s middle class, and improve the overall business climate in the region,” according to John Bolton, the national security advisor at the time. The fact that the announcement was made by the national security advisor clearly demonstrated that competition with China and Russia was a main driver of these new initiatives.
Since then, these adversaries have expanded their influence on the continent: Russia has confirmed its status as Africa’s largest arms seller and China has become Africa’s largest trading partner, now having five times more trade volume with Africa than the United States does.
Beyond Trump, the profiles of leading officials will say a lot about the intentions of the White House. From Marco Rubio (as secretary of state) to Elise Stefanik (as ambassador to the United Nations), Trump’s picks for influential positions suggest a clear interest in containing China, Russia, and other adversaries. That tougher approach could potentially be employed in the competition over influence in Africa.
Project 2025
While Trump has repeatedly distanced himself from the policy agenda known as Project 2025, he has since tapped people who helped craft the plan for various administration posts.
Project 2025, in its suggestions for the US Department of State, calls for a return of focus to “core diplomatic activities” and away from promoting policies focused on cultural values, for example ones that support LGBTQI+ rights. This would resonate positively in African countries that have criminalized LGBTQI+ people and activities, including in democratic countries such as Senegal or Ghana. Similarly, Uganda—which the Biden administration excluded from preferential trade treatment under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) due to concerns about gay rights—could find a more sympathetic ear from the Trump administration.
A business mindset
Trump’s focus on a transactional approach with Africa will likely place an emphasis on reducing development assistance in favor of expanding US-Africa business ties and fostering economic growth through free-market principles.
Renewals of AGOA and DFC in 2025 and the Export-Import Bank in 2026—if they occur—would provide signals of the direction Trump wants to pursue in his trade strategy toward Africa. The fate of certain large-scale projects such as the Lobito Corridor—US President Joe Biden’s major legacy in Africa—will also have to be monitored.
Arguing that the Paris Agreement places an unfair economic burden on Americans and their businesses, Trump withdrew from the international treaty on climate change during his first presidency. Africa, meanwhile, is paying disproportionately high costs for climate adaptation despite having contributed relatively little to the changing climate—and there remains a massive climate-finance gap. With reports indicating Trump is preparing to withdraw from the Paris Agreement again (jeopardizing global cooperation on climate change) and with African countries walking away disappointed from the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (also known as COP29) in Azerbaijan, Africa can likely expect to keep paying increasingly steep costs.
Source: atlanticcouncil